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Abstract  
This paper aims at assessing the determinants of Amazon deforestation, with an emphasis 
on the role played by off-farm income. We first present a microeconomic model which 
relates off-farm income to deforestation patterns. We then test the empirical implications by 
using data on the 2006 Brazilian Agricultural Census. Our results suggest that an increase in 
off-farm income tends to reduce deforestation. This may be explained by the fact that 
greater off-farm opportunities tends to increase the opportunity cost of farm labor. Results 
also show that smallholders are less responsive to the increase in the returns of off-farm 
activities than large ones, which is in line with our hypothesis of labor market imperfections 
regarding off-farm activities. 
Key words: deforestation, farm household, off-farm income, pseudo-panel 
JEL codes: Q12, Q23, C23 
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1 Introduction
Amazon deforestation has been a major issue in the Brazilian environmental agenda,
driven by concerns about biodiversity loss and the deterioration of ecosystem services,
including the fact that deforestation across the country represents three quarters of the
nation’s total greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Curbing deforestation rates is Brazil’s
most cost-eﬀective emissions reduction mechanism. Forest loss may also put at risk lo-
cal communities whose livelihoods depend upon the extraction of timber and non-timber
resources. Understanding the determinants of deforestation is of paramount importance
for the design and implementation of eﬀective policy measures for forest conservation.
There is a large literature on the determinants of Amazon deforestation, and several
deforestation drivers have been identiﬁed. Empirical studies have pointed out the sig-
niﬁcant role played by agricultural activities (Barona et al., 2010; Chomitz and Thomas,
2003), land settlement, governmental programs, road infrastructure (Andrade et al., 2013;
Pfaﬀ, 1999) and land tenure insecurity (Araujo et al., 2009). However, there are impor-
tant economic issues which have been neglected. In particular, one may cite the relation
between oﬀ-farm income and deforestation.
According to Bluﬀstone (1995), higher oﬀ-farm income vis-à-vis revenues associated to
agricultural activities may increase the opportunity cost of the latter, reducing the defor-
estation pressure. In this sense, public policies aimed at stimulating oﬀ-farm employment
and revenue generation could succeed in curbing deforestation.
Additionally, labor market imperfections regarding oﬀ-farm activities may have signiﬁ-
cant impacts on deforestation (Bluﬀstone, 1995; Shively and Pagiola, 2004; Groom et al.,
2010). Farmers that face restricted access to oﬀ-farm labor markets may allocate their
time between farm and oﬀ-farm activities in an ineﬃcient way. This could be the case,
for example, of smallholders that produce mainly for subsistence purposes. The need to
assure a minimum production level may lead to an excessive allocation of time to farm
activities, resulting in increasing deforestation pressure. In this way, restricted access to
oﬀ-farm labor markets not only could reduce income generation opportunities in rural
areas, but it could also imply in environmental externalities associated to increasing de-
forestation.
Production for subsistence purposes is still an important activity in the Brazilian ru-
ral sector. According to the 2006 Agricultural Census, 72.2% of the rural establishments
declared to allocate part of their production to self-consumption. More importantly, 18%
of the establishments reported that more than 90% of their total production is destined to
self-consumption. Production for subsistence purposes is particularly important in small
farms with less than 5 hectares (Grisa et al., 2014). In addition to highlight the role
played by production for subsistence purposes, the Agriculture Census also provides some
evidence that access to oﬀ-farm labor markets varies according to farmsize: while 32%
of the rural establishments with less than 5 hectares declared to have received revenues
from oﬀ-farm activities, this percentage reaches 52% among establishments with total
area ranging from 100 to 500 ha, rising up to 61% among those establishments with more
than 2,500 ha (IBGE, 2009).
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This article aims at assessing the determinants of deforestation in the Legal Amazon,
with an emphasis on the role played by oﬀ-farm income. We specify a theoretical model
and then test the empirical implications by using data on the 2006 Brazilian Agricultural
Census.
Estimation results suggest that an increase in oﬀ-farm income may reduce deforestation
rates. In fact, higher oﬀ-farm incomes could increase the opportunity cost associated to
farm activities. The latter become less attractive and farmers dedicate less time to farm
activities, therefore reducing deforestation pressure. Results also show that smallholders
are less responsive to the increase in the returns of oﬀ-farm activities than large ones,
which is in line with our hypothesis of labor market imperfections regarding oﬀ-farm ac-
tivities.
The article is organized in ﬁve sections. Following this introduction, the second section
presents a survey of the empirical literature on the determinants of Amazon deforestation.
The third section describes the theoretical model which addresses the relation between
oﬀ-farm income and deforestation, as well as the consequences of oﬀ-farm labor market
imperfections on farmers’ decisions. The fourth section presents the estimation results.
Finally, the concluding section synthetizes the main results and discusses some policy
implications.
2 Literature review
There is a vast literature on the economic determinants of deforestation.1 In this survey,
we follow the taxonomy proposed by Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999), which classify de-
forestation drivers in two groups: underlying factors and immediate causes.
The so-called underlying factors are related to macroeconomic and policy-related issues
that may have an indirect inﬂuence on agents’ decisions regarding deforestation. Underly-
ing factors include demographic pressure, economic growth, land settlement, governmen-
tal programs and regional-oriented development policies. On the other hand, immediate
causes are associated to market, technological, institutional and infrastructure conditions
that may have a direct inﬂuence on agents’ decisions regarding deforestation. Immediate
causes include the price of agricultural and forestry products, input prices, credit mar-
ket access, farm and oﬀ-farm income, technological progress, transport infrastructure and
property rights.
In what follows, we present the main empirical results regarding the inﬂuence of un-
derlying factors and immediate causes on Amazon deforestation.
2.1 Underlying factors
It is diﬃcult to establish causal connections between underlying factors and deforesta-
tion. The transmission mechanisms through which macroeconomic conditions and policy
instruments may inﬂuence deforestation decisions are diﬃcult to establish, preventing the
1This section presents the empirical results related to Amazon deforestation. For a broader analysis,
see Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999) or Barbier and Burgess (2001).
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identiﬁcation of causal relations. Such diﬃculty may be illustrated by the relation be-
tween demographic growth and deforestation. Population growth tends to increase the
demand for agricultural products, which leads to higher returns in agricultural activities.
The higher returns on agricultural activities tend to increase the deforestation pressure.
However, population growth is a potentially endogenous variable in deforestation mod-
els. Several studies suggest that population growth in forest regions is induced by road
construction, land settlement programs and ﬁscal subsidies. So, deforestation pressures
should be attributed to the infrastructure and governmental policies, and not to demo-
graphic growth. Actually, Pfaﬀ (1999) observes that population density is not statistically
signiﬁcant in deforestation models that control for infrastructure and institutional char-
acteristics.
The relation between economic growth and deforestation is also quite complex. On the
one side, higher economic growth may increase the demand for agricultural products,
providing incentives for additional deforestation due to agricultural expansion. On the
other hand, higher economic growth is associated to an increase in oﬀ-farm income and
employment opportunities, thus reducing the pressure on deforestation. Andersen and
Reis (1997) and Reis and Blanco (2000) observe that economic growth has a positive im-
pact on deforestation. Nepstad et al. (2009) suggest that the recent slowdown in Amazon
deforestation is related to the global ﬁnancial crisis. However, the empirical models do
not include variables related to oﬀ-farm income. It should also be remarked that the
causality between economic growth and deforestation may be inverted: the exploitation
of forest resources may determine economic growth. In this sense, econometric models
assessing the relationship between economic growth and deforestation should take into
account potential endogeneity problems related to reverse causality.
Regarding public policies, empirical studies suggest that policy measures implemented by
the Brazilian government during 1960-1980 have contributed to Amazon deforestation.
During this period, the government promoted the occupation of the Amazon territory
based on land settlement projects, subsidized credit for agricultural activities and road
construction. Andersen and Reis (1997) estimate that this regional development strategy
had a positive impact of USD 4.5 billion in the regional GDP. On the other hand, such
policies have provided a decisive contribution to Amazon deforestation.
2.2 Immediate causes
There is substantial empirical evidence on the inﬂuence of agricultural product prices on
deforestation. Higher proﬁtability in agricultural activities induces the expansion of the
agricultural frontier and therefore contributes to the deforestation process. In the Ama-
zon case, Margulis (2003) identiﬁes the high economic returns on cattle ranching activities
as the major deforestation driver. By contrast, Ferraz (2001) does not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
statistical relationship between agricultural product prices and deforestation. This result
may be explained by the geo-ecological barriers to agricultural practices in the Amazon
region. In fact, the region is characterized by precipitation levels above 2,000 mm/year.
Such high precipitation levels have a negative impact on the agricultural productivity of
several crops.
On the input side, land prices may have a dubious role in the deforestation process. Higher
6
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land prices may reduce the demand for land, therefore reducing deforestation pressure.
Rising land prices may also provide incentives for cattle ranching intensiﬁcation, thus
decreasing new clearing of forest for ranching. On the other hand, higher land prices also
mean higher expected returns to the deforestation agents, resulting in increasing defor-
estation due to speculative reasons. In the Amazon case, Andersen and Reis (1997) and
Ferraz (2001) ﬁnd a negative relation between land prices and deforestation, suggesting
that higher land prices may reduce deforestation rates.
Higher farm wages tend to increase the cost of agricultural activities and therefore to
reduce deforestation rates. In the same way, higher oﬀ-farm income would turn farm
activities less attractive, contributing to a reduction in deforestation rates. Ferraz (2001)
is the only work that addresses the relation between rural wages and deforestation. The
author does not ﬁnd a statistical signiﬁcant relation between the two variables. However,
it is worth noting that any work has analyzed the question of oﬀ-farm income, the subject
of the present paper.
In relation to infrastructure, the construction of new roads tends to reduce transport
costs. Lower transport costs increases agricultural proﬁtability. In this sense, one expects
a positive relation between road density and deforestation. Such relation is veriﬁed to the
Amazon context by Andersen and Reis (1997), Pfaﬀ (1999) and Ferraz (2001).
Finally, regarding institutional features, poor enforcement of property rights is also an
important determinant of deforestation. In the Amazon region, where a large number of
farmers do not have land titles, deforestation may act as a signal that the land is allocated
to productive purposes. Deforestation as a signal of land use is a strategy adopted by
farmers to reduce expropriation risk, since forest areas may be seen as “unproductive land”
and therefore subject to expropriation and inclusion in the land reform program. Araujo
et al. (2009) analyze the impact of land tenure insecurity in the Amazon region. The
authors do not reject the hypothesis that the precarious property rights are associated to
higher deforestation rates.
3 Economic model
This section presents the theoretical model which addresses the relation between oﬀ-farm
income and deforestation. The model is based on Groom et al. (2010). For expositional
purposes, we ﬁrst analyze farmers’ behavior in a framework without labor market im-
perfections. Next, we consider labor market imperfections by introducing restrictions on
access to oﬀ-farm activities.
3.1 Basic model
We consider a rural household whose preferences are deﬁned by the revenue level y, time
allocated to leisure and a vector of consumption determinants zc. The household decides
to allocate the time T among three activities: leisure (lz), farm labor (lon) and oﬀ-farm
labor (loff), such that T = lz + lon + loff. We assume that oﬀ-farm wage is exogeneous
and denoted by woff.
7
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The rural household has a total land endowment denoted by N. Agricultural produc-
tion is determined by the amount of land and farm labor, and it may be represented by
the production function q(lon, n), where q is the production quantity, lon the quantity
of labor allocated to farm activities and n the land allocated to agricultural production.
The production technology follows the standard assumptions adopted by the literature:
q1(l
on,n) > 0, q2(l
on,n) > 0, q11(l
on,n) < 0 and q22(l
on,n) < 0, where index i refers to the
partial derivative with respect to the i-th argument of the function.2 We also consider
that land and farm labor are complementary inputs: q12(l
on,n) > 0. This last hypothesis
is supported by empirical estimates of Brazilian agricultural production function param-
eters (Gomes and Rosado, 2005; Conte and Ferreira Filho, 2007).
The rural household utility function U(y, lz, c) is concave and twice diﬀerentiable. Total
household income is given by the sum of farm agricultural revenue and oﬀ-farm income,
and it may be represented by y = p.q(lon,n) + woff loff. The time allocated to leisure is
expressed by lz = T – lon – loff. The optimization problem faced by the rural household
may be expressed by
Max
lon,loff ,n
= U [pq(lon, n) + woff loff , T − lon − loff , c] (1)
such that
n ≤ N ;
lon ≥ 0 ;
loff ≥ 0
We consider the case where rural households allocate time for both farm and oﬀ-farm
activities.3 In this case, the ﬁrst order conditions of the optimization problem (1) are
given by the following expressions:
U1(.)w
off
− U2(.) = 0 (2)
U1(.)pq1(.) − U2(.) = 0 (3)
U1(.)pq2(.) + λ
n = 0 (4)
λn(N − n) = 0, λn ≥ 0, (N − n) ≥ 0 (5)
where U1(.) is the marginal utility of the revenue, U2(.) is the marginal utility of leisure
and λn is the Lagrangean multiplier associated to the land restriction. If the farmer does
not use all available land, the ﬁrst order conditions may be written as
U1(.)w
off
− U2(.) = 0 (6)
2In other words, q1 =
∂q(lon, n)
∂lon
, q2 =
∂q(lon, n)
∂n
, q11 =
∂2q(lon, n)
∂lon
2
and q22 =
∂2q(lon, n)
∂n2
3We assume that farm and off-farm activities are divisible. This is not a restrictive hypothesis, since
our empirical application deals with aggregated data.
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U1(.)pq1(.) − U2(.) = 0 (7)
pq2(.) = 0 (8)
From conditions (6) and (7), one may verify that
woff = pqi(l
on, n∗) (9)
where n* is the optimal quantity of land allocated to agricultural activities. Condition
(9) indicates that the rural household will choose to use farmland such that the marginal
productivity of farm activities is equal to the wage paid by oﬀ-farm activities.
From the optimization conditions, we may state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 : an increase in oﬀ-farm income will lead to a reduction in the use of
farmland, therefore reducing deforestation pressure.
Proof: First we show that, given the complementarity between farm labor and farmland
use, an increase (reduction) in farm labor implies in increasing (decreasing) farmland use.
From conditions (8), we observe that q2 (l
on,n(lon)) = 0. By applying the implicit function
theorem, we have
d(n)
d(lon)
= −
q21(l
on, n(lon))
q22(lon, n(lon)
> 0 (10)
In other words, an increase (reduction) in farm labor implies in increasing (decreasing)
farmland use.
By taking the total diﬀerential of equation (9) while keeping the exogeneous variable
p constant, we have
d(woff ) = p[q11(l
on, n)d(lon) + q12(l
on, n)
d(n)
d(lon)
d(lon)] (11)
Therefore, an increase in oﬀ-farm income implies a higher marginal productivity associ-
ated to farm activities, which is obtained by reducing lon and n.
This result may be explained by the higher opportunity cost associated to farm labor
when there is an increase in oﬀ-farm income woff. Farmers will allocate less time to farm
labor, thus reducing lon and farmland use n. Since farm activities become less attractive
vis-a-vis the oﬀ-farm labor market, there is a reduction in deforestation pressure.
3.2 Introducing market failures: restricted access to off-farm la-
bor markets
In this section we show that rural households which face restricted access to oﬀ-farm labor
markets may incur in ineﬃcient decisions regarding farm labor and land use. Speciﬁcally,
households which must attain a certain threshold level in agricultural production may
9
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choose farm labor and land use quantities above the optimal level, leading to more defor-
estation pressure.
Suppose that the rural household must attain a minimum production level q¯. This can
be the case of smallholders who should attain a certain subsistence level. In this case, the
optimization problem is given by
Max
lon,loff ,n
= U [pq(lon, n) + woff loff , T − lon − loff , c] (12)
such that
q(lon, n) ≥ q¯ ;
n ≤ N ;
lon ≥ 0 ;
loff ≥ 0
The ﬁrst order conditions for the optimization program are the following:
U1(.)w
off
− U2(.) = 0 (13)
U1(.)pq1(.) − U2(.) = 0 (14)
−U1(.)pq2(.) + µ
qq2(.) + µ
n = 0 (15)
µq[q¯ − q(lon, n) = 0, µq ≥ 0, c− q(lon, n) ≤ 0 (16)
µn = 0, µn ≥ 0 (17)
where µn and µq are the Lagrangean multipliers associated to the land and production
restrictions, respectively.
The analysis of the ﬁrst order conditions allows us to establish proposition 2.
Proposition 2: for rural households facing a binding production restriction
• farmers will use the total land area N.
• farmers will allocate labor and land quantities to rural activities above the optimal
level, increasing deforestation pressure.
Proof: Consider a rural household facing a binding production constraint, i.e., produc-
ing the minimum quantity q¯. In this case, we have µq > 0. From expression (15), we
may observe that if µq > 0, µn is also strictly positive. Therefore, if farmers produce the
minimum quantity q¯, they will use all available land N. This result implies that smallhold-
ers that produce for subsistence purposes or sharecroppers that should have a minimum
production performance will have higher deforestation rates.
10
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Finally, from conditions (13) and (14), we may observe that households facing bind-
ing production restrictions may not be able to equalize the marginal returns of farm and
oﬀ-farm labor,
woff = pq1(.) + µ
q q1(.)
U1(.)
(18)
The oﬀ-farm labor price faced by constrained households is a shadow-price whose value
lies below the market price woff. For these constrained agents, the opportunity cost associ-
ated to farm labor is lower than the marginal return associated to oﬀ-farm activities woff.
Given the lower opportunity costs, the agents choose farm labor and land use quantities
above the optimal level, leading to increasing deforestation pressure. In addition to that,
households facing biding production restrictions will be less sensitive to an increase in
oﬀ-farm revenues.
In the empirical application that follows, we assume that smallholders face binding pro-
duction constraints. As mentioned in the introductory section, 18% of the establishments
reported that more than 90% of their total production is destined to self-consumption.
Production for subsistence purposes is particularly important in small farms with less
than 5 hectares (Grisa et al., 2014). The Agriculture Census also provides some evidence
that access to oﬀ-farm labor markets varies according to farmsize: while 32% of the rural
establishments with less than 5 hectares declared to have received revenues from oﬀ-farm
activities, this percentage reaches 52% among establishments with total area ranging
from 100 to 500 ha, rising up to 61% among those establishments with more than 2,500
ha (IBGE, 2009).
4 Empirical evidence
From the theoretical model described in the previous section, we can derive the following
testable hypotheses: (i) higher oﬀ-farm income is associated with a reduction in deforesta-
tion; and (ii) higher oﬀ-farm income provides less incentives for smallholders to reduce
deforestation when compared to large ones, since smallholders have restricted access to
oﬀ-farm labor markets.
To evaluate the hypotheses, we specify an econometric model. The model is estimated by
using a two dimensional pseudo-panel method. The panel is composed by the 604 munic-
ipalities located in the Amazon region and classiﬁed according to 11 farm size categories.4
The size categories are the clusters in our pseudo-panel structure.
The econometric model has the following speciﬁcation:
Defij = α + β1Y
off
ij + β2Tij + β3Xij + β4Nij + β5Y
off
ij ×Nij + ηj + θi + ǫij (19)
4Size categories are defined by the following intervals: category 1) below 1 ha. ; category 2) from 1 to
5 ha.; category 3) from 5 to 10 ha.; category 4) from 10 to 20 ha.; category 5) from 20 to 50 ha.; category
6) from 50 to 100 ha.; category 7) from 100 to 200 ha.; category 8) from 200 to 500 ha.; category 9) from
500 to 1,000 ha.; category 10) from 1,000 to 10,000 ha.; category 11) above 10,000 ha.
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where index i refers to municipality and index j represents farm size category (j = 1,...,11).
Variable Defij is the deforestation measure in agricultural establishments located in mu-
nicipality i belonging to size category j, Yoffij is the relative oﬀ-farm income measure, T
is a vector which provides the proportional distribution of the establishments according
to land ownership status (owner, sharecropper, land renter and squatter), Xij is a vector
of socioeconomic characteristics that may aﬀect deforestation decisions and Nij is total
farmland. Variable Yoffij × Nij is the cross product between oﬀ-farm income and farm-
size. By introducing the cross-product term, we allow the marginal impact of oﬀ-farm
wage on deforestation to vary across farm size. Such heterogeneity enable us to assess the
hypothesis that smallholders are less sensible to oﬀ-farm income increases. Parameters α,
β1, β2, β3, β4 and β5 are the regression coeﬃcients to be estimated, ηj and θi stand for the
ﬁxed eﬀects regarding farm size categories and municipality, respectively, while ǫij rep-
resents the idiosyncratic error which is assumed to follow the distribution ǫij ∼ iid(0, σ
2
ǫ ).
Database was constructed from the Brazilian Agricultural Census 2006. Variable Defij
corresponds to total deforested area divided by the number of establishments within each
category. This normalization is intended to mitigate scale eﬀects associated to diﬀerent
number of observations within each size category. So, one can interpret variable Defij as
the average deforested area in the representative farm of category j at municipality i. A
similar procedure is applied to normalize all regression variables expressed in level. Rel-
ative oﬀ-farm income Yoffij is expressed in terms of share, computed by dividing oﬀ-farm
wage5 by total revenue from both agricultural and oﬀ-farm activities. The proportion
of establishments according to ownership status is computed by dividing the number of
establishments belonging to a certain ownership category by the total number of estab-
lishments. Variable Nij refers to the farm area of the representative establishment within
category j. We also include as an explanatory variable the average debt of the representa-
tive establishment within category j. Households’ eﬀorts to increase revenues to pay their
debt could positively contribute to deforestation.
Estimation of equation (19) raises endogeneity concerns. In fact, deforestation and labor
supply decisions are likely to be simultaneous. In order to account for the endogeneity
of the relative oﬀ-farm income, we use the share of rural pension beneﬁts relative to the
total revenue of the establishment as an instrument. The Brazilian social security reform
of 1991 implemented the widespread coverage of rural pensions: any rural male worker
above 60 years old or female rural worker above 55 years is eligible for old-age beneﬁts
irrespective of the decision to retire and of previous contribution to the social security
system. The minimum beneﬁt paid to rural old-age beneﬁciaries is one minimum salary,
and coverage includes rural workers who are not heads of households. As observed by Car-
valho Filho (2008), because Brazilian rural beneﬁciaries are subject to neither earnings
test nor requirement to retire, the decision to apply for a rural old-age beneﬁt is not strate-
gic. Therefore, it should be not correlated to the error term of the regression. In addition
to that, the income-support eﬀect provided by rural beneﬁts may relax the biding produc-
tion restriction (Delgado and Cardoso Jr, 2000). Therefore, one could expect a positive
relationship between the relative oﬀ-farm income and the share of rural beneﬁts. This
5The 2006 Agricultural Census reports several types of off-farm revenues: salaries received in off-farm
activities, pensions, retirement benefits, donations, governmental transfers and others. In constructing
our off-farm income variable, we consider only the off-farm wage component.
12
Etudes et Documents n◦ 23, CERDI, 2014
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - average values according to size category
Farm size Defor- Share of Land- Rent Share- Squatter Debt Farms Surface
estation off-farm owners cropping
(ha) (%) wage (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (R$) (number) (ha)
Less than 1 91.5 40.5 65.5 7.1 9.7 17.8 914.05 183.20 0.34
1 to 5 82.6 39.9 75.4 6.0 3.7 14.8 2913.62 142.17 2.31
5 to 10 69.0 33.9 86.6 2.2 1.6 9.6 3807.16 56.24 6.46
10 to 20 62.9 39.5 87.8 4.3 0.9 6.9 5226.95 85.45 13.10
20 to 50 55.4 48.4 89.8 3.2 0.8 6.2 7412.36 206.97 31.34
50 to 100 55.9 51.5 89.1 2.9 2.4 5.6 10532.59 155.08 66.02
100 to 200 55.4 53.1 90.1 2.8 1.7 5.3 16905.31 90.67 126.78
200 to 500 54.8 56.3 90.6 3.2 1.6 4.5 43283.15 51.53 290.93
500 to 1000 53.8 42.2 92.5 3.2 1.0 3.3 80745.87 20.54 623.60
1000 to 10000 50.4 43.2 95.7 2.2 0.7 1.4 311632.45 23.71 2188.72
More than 10000 46.7 5.2 94.1 3.6 0.2 2.1 389909.41 3.71 17561.72
Source: IBGE
is conﬁrmed by the ﬁrst stage of our instrumental variable regressions (see Appendix A1).6
Table 1 presents the average of each variable according to size category. It can be noted
that larger establishments tend to deforest a smaller proportion of total area and to present
higher oﬀ-farm income. Ownership structure is also related to farm size: the proportion
of landowners is higher in the larger establishment categories. Preliminary evidence on
the negative relationship between oﬀ-farm income and deforestation is provided by the
scatter diagrams in Appendix A2. In the majority of states within the Amazon region,
one may ﬁnd a negative linear trend between oﬀ-farm wage and deforestation, indicating
that higher deforestation rates are associated with low levels of oﬀ-farm income.
Table 2 presents the econometric results. Regression speciﬁcations diﬀer according to the
control variables, the use of instrumental variables and the inclusion of the cross-product
variable accounting for the heterogeneity of oﬀ-farm wage marginal impacts. Regression
results provide empirical support for the ﬁrst hypothesis derived from the theoretical
model. Coeﬃcients related to oﬀ-farm income present the expected negative sign and
they are statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations that do not account for heterogeneity
in oﬀ-farm wage marginal impacts (speciﬁcations (1) to (4) and (7)). This negative re-
lation suggests that higher relative oﬀ-farm wage vis-à-vis on-farm revenues may reduce
deforestation, providing empirical support to our ﬁrst hypothesis. According to the spec-
iﬁcation presented in columns (7), a 1% increase in relative oﬀ-farm income contribute
to a reduction of 0.07% in deforestation. This result is in line with our argument that
higher oﬀ-farm income corresponds to an increase in opportunity costs regarding farm-
ing activities, reducing the attractiveness of farming activities and therefore deforestation.
The introduction of the cross-product (equations (5), (6), (8) and (9)) allows us to assess
how deforestation decisions react to oﬀ-farm revenue variation according to farm size cat-
egories. The oﬀ-farm wage elasticity computed from equation (8) is presented in Figure
6It should be remarked that our instrument is based on the income composition of the rural household,
and not on income level. In this sense, the share of rural benefits should be only indirectly related to
deforestation via labor supply decisions.
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Table 2: Econometric results
Dependent variable: deforestation level at representative farm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables PLS PLS PLS PLS PLS PLS P2SLS P2SLS P2SLS
intercept 3.554 3.519 3.389 -0.053 0.056 0.128 -0.260 0.169 0.296
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.662) (0.667) (0.303) (0.039) (0.251) (0.043)
ln(off-farm wage share) -0.040 -0.035 -0.026 -0.005 0.043 0.055 -0.071 0.096 0.094
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.306) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007)
rent 0.435 0.437 0.493 0.501 0.475 0.391 0.375 0.378
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
sharecrop 0.186 0.396 0.568 0.428 0.622 0.493 0.632 0.640
(0.253) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
squatter 0.300 0.121 0.189 0.256 0.199 0.190 0.242 0.344
(0.001) (0.096) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(debt) 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.032
(0.024) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.001)
ln(farm size) 0.780 0.804 0.744 0.777 0.674 0.690
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(off-farm wage share) -0.009 -0.012 -0.034 -0.039
× ln(farm size) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.970 0.979 0.988 0.981 0.988 0.986 0.986 0.981
SSR 291.63 286.58 150.71 87.03 175.78 85.58 69.67 70.79 113.58
Sample 3119 3117 2669 2669 3117 2669 2326 2326 2559
F -test fixed effects 375.10 290.46 203.16 18.97 14.14 19.28 17.52 19.10 26.77
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Shea’s partial R2 0.132 0.137 0.145
Note: p-value in parenthesis; PLS: panel least squares; P2SLS: panel two-stage least squares.
1. One can notice that smallholders are less responsive to the increase in the returns of
oﬀ-farm activities than large ones, which is in line with our hypothesis of labor market
imperfections regarding oﬀ-farm activities. In fact, for the ﬁrst two size categories, an
increase in oﬀ-farm revenues is associated to higher deforestation. From the third cate-
gory on, an increase in oﬀ-farm revenues is associated to a reduction in the deforestation.
The reduction is higher for large farms. One possible explanation for this pattern is the
restricted access to oﬀ-farm activities faced by smallholders.
The inﬂuence of ownership status on deforestation patterns is assessed by using landown-
ers as the reference category. Results show a positive relation between the proportion
of squatters and deforestation. This can be explained by the precarious property rights
conditions experienced by squatters. Land insecurity experienced by squatters may in-
crease their discount rate, therefore increasing deforestation pressure (Araujo and Araujo-
Bonjean, 1999). Land renters also tend to deforest more than landowners. This result
may be explained by the fact that rented lands are the ones with highest agricultural
potential. Finally, it should be remaked that the sign of the debt variable is positive, as
expected.
5 Conclusion and policy recommendations
This article aimed at evaluating the determinants of Amazon deforestation, with partic-
ular emphasis on the role of oﬀ-farm income. We ﬁrst presented a microeconomic model
which relates oﬀ-farm income to deforestation patterns. We then speciﬁed and estimated
an econometric model using data on the 2006 Brazilian Agricultural Census.
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Our results suggest that an increase in oﬀ-farm income is likely to reduce deforesta-
tion. This ﬁnding may be explained by the fact that higher oﬀ-farm income increase the
opportunity cost of farm labor, and so farmers allocate less time to agricultural activities
and therefore deforestation pressure is reduced. In this sense, policymakers aiming at
curbing deforestation may implement employment and income generation programs not
directly related to agricultural activities. For example, policymakers may provide eco-
nomic incentives for forest-related acivities. By making forestry activities economically
more attractive, it raises the opportunity cost of agricultural activities, therefore reducing
deforestation.
Results also show that smallholders are less responsive to the increase in the returns
of oﬀ-farm activities than large ones, which is in line with our hypothesis of labor market
imperfections regarding oﬀ-farm activities.
Regarding ownership status, results suggest that renters and squatters tend to defor-
est a larger extent of their establishment areas, when compared to landowners. On the
other hand, results do not provide empirical support to the hypothesis that sharecroppers
tend to deforest more due to labor market imperfections.
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Appendix
Appendix A1: Instrumental variable regression - ﬁrst stage results
Dependent variable: ln(off-farm wage share)
Specification Specification Specification
Variables (7) (8) (9)
intercept -0.670 -0.704 -0.570
(0.118) (0.105) (0.073)
ln(retire share) 0.511 0.498 0.434
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rent -0.527 -0.513 -0.592
(0.017) (0.022) (0.006)
sharecrop -0.366 -0.379 -0.077
(0.467) (0.456) (0.859)
squatter -0.001 0.003 0.057
(0.995) (0.989) (0.741)
ln(debt) 0.011 0.011
(0.708) (0.707)
ln(farm size) -0.148 -0.141 -0.159
(0.065) (0.084) (0.030)
ln(retire share) 0.003 0.014
× ln(farm size) (0.797) (0.145)
Adjusted R2 0.645 0.644 0.632
SSR 969.37 969.33 1161.56
Sample 2326 2326 2559
Note: p-value in parenthesis
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Appendix A2. Scatter  diagrams - off-farm wage share and deforestatio n share
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